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Franchising in the Common Market: A Survey of
the Application of Competition Law of the
European Community to Retail Franchising
Paul C. Ridgeway*
I.

Introduction •

Franchising, since its introduction into the Common Market in
the early 1970s, has become one of the most rapidly growing sectors
of commercial activity. Member States have witnessed the number of
franchise networks double and redouble every few years; France, for
example, experienced an increase from 300 networks to 500 networks from 1981 to 1985, with a total of 25,000 franchisees by
1985.' With figures like these to rely on, it seems safe to say that
franchising is becoming an important method of retailing in the
Common Market.
The ,European Community and the Member States have been
slow to respond legislatively or judicially to franchising. However,
1986 can be viewed as the "year of the franchise" in the EEC; both
the Court of Justice and the Commission have issued decisions directly examining franchising from a competition perspective. The
decisions are broadly based with far-reaching implications for
franchising, and the Commission has promised more consideration
of the issue in the future.
This article is a survey of the law relevant to franchising in the
Common Market. It is divided into four primary sections: first, a
factual examination of the various proclamations, statements, decisions, and opinions issued by the institutions of the European Community; second, a brief examination of law applicable to the related
issues of exclusive distributorships, selective distributor arrangements, licensing agreements, jurisdictional matters, and the policies
regarding small and medium-sized enterprises; third, an examination
* Associate, Barringer, Allen & Pinnix, Raleigh, N.C.; B.S., M.P.A., North Carolina
State University:J.D., cnu laude, Campbell University; 1). Int'l L., University of Amsterdam.
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I Prontuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1I 14,245 (1986) (opinion of Advocate General P. VerLoren van
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of the Community law directly applied to franchising in general and
to selected clauses from typical franchise agreements; and finally,
concluding'observations regarding the application of the rule of reason to franchising and the future of franchising in the EEC.
II. The Definition of Franchising and its Legal Characteristics
The definition of franchising in the Common Market, as originally set forth by Mr. E.M. Kneppers-Heynert, and adopted by the
Community institutions, is as follows:
Franchising is a contractually governed form of commercial cooperation between independent undertakings, whereby one party,
the franchisor, gives one or more parties, the franchisees, the right
to use his trade name or mark and other distinguishing features, in
the sale of products or of services. The sale takes place on the basis
of an exclusive marketing concept (system or formula) developed by
the franchisor; in return, the franchisee is supervised by the2
franchisor in order to ensure uniform quality of goods or services.

This definition covers both the provisions of goods and services, but
excludes manufacturing franchises. Essential in this definition are
the main elements of franchising: legal independence, royalties, supervision, a common marketing strategy, image, and trade name or
trademark.
III. European Community Institutions' Considerations of Franchising:
1976 to Present
The official institutions of the European Community have directly examined franchising on five occasions to date. 3 The first occasion was a preliminary study sponsored by the Commission in
October 1976 through its working committee on commerce and distribution. The committee set about to analyze franchising on the basis of information obtained from the various Member States and to
outline the advantages and disadvantages that might be connected
with the system. Further, the committee was instructed to "state
whether or not legislation on this relatively new form of cooperation
in the Community was desirable and whether other measures should
be taken in the Community to help this system develop as effectively
' 4
as possible."
The results of this study, published in March 1978, were somewhat mundane. The study concluded that franchising was wide2

E.M. Kneppers-Heynert, Franchising en de Handelsnaam: What's in a AName?, 10 Bij251 (1984), cited in Pronnptia de Paris v.Schillgalis, 4 Common

BLAD INDUSTRIELE EIGENDOM

Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,445.
3 A number of offhand remarks have been made regarding franchising. See, e.g. Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy, Supp. 4/85, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY, pt. 32; 1 BULL.
EUR. COMMUNITY 26 (1986); Supp. 1/86, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY, pt. 14.

4 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE COOPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS

INTHE COMMUNITY: FRANCHISING 5 (1978) (information on source available from author).
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spread and transnational, but that data was fragmentary, 5 and that
franchising had advantages for the consumer and the contracting
parties, but that the franchisee could be subjected to abuse from the
stronger franchisor. 6 No Member State had adopted legislation concerning franchising. 7 Finally, the report concluded that "in certain
cases, individual franchising contracts may run counter to the principles embodied in Article 85 of the E.C. Treaty. ' '8 The report suggested that another study be conducted to examine the issue further.
The second occasion where the issue of franchising was examined arose in the form of a parliamentary question submitted in
1980 to the European Commission. The member of the European
Parliament asked the Commission: "Does not the Commission feel
that the time has come to put an end to the legal uncertainty prevailing in this area by publishing a communication clearly setting out its
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id. at 18.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 17. Article 85 of the European Economic Community Treaty prohibits as
incompatible with the Common Market, inter alia, all agreements between undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the
Common Market. European Economic Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3, 11 [hereinafter cited by appropriate Article number]. Agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to Article 85(1) are void ab initio. Furthermore, parties to such agreements
may be subjected to sanctions from the Commission including cease and desist orders and
fines of a magnitude of one million ECU (roughly one million U.S. dollars) or up to ten
percent of the annual turnover of the parties concerned, whichever is greater. Council
Regulation (EEC) 17, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 5
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 204) 62, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401 (1962) [hereinafter
Council Regulation 17].
The Commission may, however, declare the prohibition and consequences of Articles
85(1) and (2) inapplicable to a specific agreement or concerted action, or to a general class
of agreements. The Commission's decision in these matters depends upon whether the
anticompetitive effects of the practice or agreement are sufficiently counterbalanced by a
number of beneficial conditions listed in Article 85(3), which includes considerations such
as whether the agreement contributes to the improvement of distribution or production or
economic progress, whether the consumer benefits by the agreement, whether the restrictions are indispensable, and the competitive nature of the market in general. See EEC
COMPETITION RULES: GUIDE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 18 (1983).
To obtain such an exemption, the parties to an agreement or practice must notify the
Commission of the agreement or practice. Although notification is not mandated, once an
agreement or practice is notified, the Commission will impose no fines for further activities
of the parties based upon the notified course of action until a final decision is reached.
Once notified, the Commission may grant a negative clearance, which is a formal decision
of the Commission that the agreement or practice does not in fact violate Article 85(1), or
the Commission may grant an exemption, which is a formal decision that allows the parties
to continue with the agreement or practice in spite of its violation of Article 85(1). An
exemption is always limited in time, and may require the parties to modify the agreement
or practice in some way as a prerequisite to the exemption. Id. at 42. The Commission
may dispense with the need for notification altogether by issuing a block exemption,
whereby all agreements or practices complying with the block exemption regulation may
be assumed exempted without the need for notification. Id. at 32-34. See infra notes 44-48
and accompanying text (regarding the block exemptions for agreements and practices connected with exclusive distributorships and exclusive purchasing).
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policy?"" The Commission responded that "under the present circumstances there does not appear to be any need to publish a notice
clarifying the application of the competition rules to franchise agreements,' ° and referred to its "considerable number" of decisions
and judgments clarifying the applicability of Articles 85(1) and (3).''
The final three occasions require more extensive analysis. Initially, it may be observed that the Commission now feels that the
time has come to establish a degree of legal certainty in the area of
franchising. In 1986 the Commission came forth with two decisions,
the Pronuptia decision 12 and the Yves Rocher decision.'1 The Court of
Justice, however, led the way with its opinion inJanuary 1986 regard4
ing the Pronuptia franchise network.'
A.

The Facts of the PronuptiaJudgment

The Pronuptia dispute' 5 came before the Court of Justice by
means of an Article 177 reference from the Bundesgerichtshof (the German Supreme Court for civil matters) seeking interpretation of Article 85 and Regulation 67/67 of the Commission as applied to
franchise agreements. The litigants, the plaintiff-franchisor Pronuptia de Paris GmbH and the defendant-franchisee Pronuptia de Paris
Irmgard Schillgalis of Hamburg, had come to the German court following a refusal of the franchisee to pay arrears of several years' license fees, an amount totalling DM 158,502.
The franchisor is a subsidiary of a French public limited company specializing in the sale of bridal wear and accessories. The parent company -carries on business throughout Europe, the United
States, Canada, Japan and Lebanon, and has approximately 235
franchised outlets in Europe, as well as a system of wholly-owned
outlets. 16 It requires approximately $20,000 to $70,000 minimum
9 Written Question No. 1694/74 by Mr. Becmen to the Commission of European
Communities, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 33 (1980).
10 Commission Answer to Question No. 1694/74, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 34
(1980).
1l Id.
12 Commission Decision of 17 December 1986, in proceedings tinder Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty, (IV/30,937 - Pronuptia), 30 O.. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854 (1986).
1 Commission Decision of 17 December 1986, relating to a proceeding tinder Article

85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31,428 to 31,432 - Yves Rocher), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8)
49, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,855 (1986).
14 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Imgard Schillgalis, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245 (1986).

15 A number of commentaries have been written dealing with the Proinptia case. See
Goebel, Case Annotation, 23 COMMON MKT. I. RE v. 683 (1986); Korah, Pronaptia Frihising:
The Mamiage of Reason and the EEC Competition Rndes, 4 EtJR. INDUS. PROP. REV. 99 (1986);
Van Empel, Franchising in the EEC; Pronuptia ex Post. 20 J. WORLD TRADE. L. 401 (1986);
Venit, Case Comment, 11 EUR. L. REv. 213 (1986).
16 G. GOLzEN, C. BARROW & A. SEVERN, TAKING. Ui' A FRANCHISE 212 (2d ed. 1984)
(information on source available fiom author).
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start-up capital of its franchisees, 17 and an initial fee depending upon
the population of the allotted sales territory. 18 A royalty of about ten
percent of total turnover is due monthly.19
The franchisor and the franchisee entered three identical agreements on February 24, 1980, granting the franchisee a retail distribution franchise in three areas. The franchisor promised (i) the
exclusive right to use the "Pronuptia de Paris" trade name within the
defined geographic territory, (ii) not to open another Pronuptia shop
within the territory, (iii) not to provide goods or services to third
parties within the territory, and (iv) to provide commercial assistance
in advertising, training, stocking, and generally increasing turnover
20
and profits.
The franchisee, in turn, remained a sole proprietor, bearing the
risk of the business itself, and promised (i) to sell Pronuptia-marked
products only from the shops referred to in the contract, which were
to be equipped in accordance with the image of the franchisor, (ii) to
purchase eighty percent of its wedding-related inventory from the
franchisor and the remainder of its inventory from approved suppliers, (iii) to pay an entrance fee and monthly royalties, (iv) to refrain,
for the duration of the contract plus one year thereafter, from competing with the Pronuptia brand within the Federal Republic of Germany or any area where the brand was already represented, (v) to
use best efforts in its sales of Pronuptia products, (vi) to maintain the
integrity of the trade name and trademark of the franchisor, (vii) to
use the business methods of the franchisor, and (viii) to harmonize
its advertising with that of the franchisor, using advertising materials
supplied by the franchisor with the recommended resale price
21
therein.
When the franchisor sued the franchisee for arrears in royalty
payments, the franchisee responded that the franchise agreements
were illegal and void under German and EEC competition law. The
Oberlandesgericht,the German court of appeals, accepted this defense,
whereupon the franchisor appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof. The
Bundesgerichtshof referred the following questions to the Court of
Justice:
(1) Is Article 85(1) applicable to franchise agreements?
(2) If the first question is answered affirmatively, is Regulation
67/67 applicable so as to exempt franchise agreements, and,
(3) If the second question is answered affirmatively, is Regula17 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) at 39 n.5, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,040
n.5.
18 Id. at 41 n.I, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,040 n.1.

19 G. GOLZEN, C. BARROW & A. SEVERN, supra note 16, at 212.
20 Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgalis, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,436.

"2 Id. at 16,436-37.
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tion 67/67 applicable to franchise agreements which contain, among
other things,
(a) recommendations regarding resale prices and advertising
requirements,

(b) location clauses, or
(c) exclusive purchasing obligations?22
The Court of Justice, for reasons elaborated upon below, responded to the Bundesgerichtshofby describing franchising as a system
which "is not itself restrictive of competition. ' 23 As such, the Court
continued, those clauses of franchise agreements which are "indispensable to prevent the know-how and assistance provided by the
franchisor from benefiting competitors" and those clauses which are
"essential for the preservation of the identity and the reputation of
the organization ' 24 are permitted under the Community's competition law. To the extent that the Pronuptia franchise agreement contained only such clauses, the Court of Justice responded to the
Bundesgerichtshofby holding that Article 85(1) did not apply. 25 Other
clauses of the agreement may violate Article 85(1), especially if a
clause has the effect of partitioning markets or constitutes resale
price maintenance. The determination of whether the Pronuptia
agreement contained any impermissible clauses, was left to the
Bundesgerichtshof.
To the extent that the Bundesgerichtshof's first question was answered affirmatively, the Court ofJustice addressed the second question. The Court noted that franchising has fundamental
characteristics not found in distribution agreements--e.g. common
marking, uniform marketing methods, royalty payments, and the
critical need for protection of network identity, reputation, and secret marketing methods. For this reason, the Court concluded that
did
Regulation 67/67 could not apply, primarily because the drafters
26
not envision franchises when the Regulation was drafted.
B.

The Facts of the Pronuptia Commission Decision

The publication of the Court's Pronuptia decision prompted the
Commission to deliver its finding regarding the standard form retail
franchise agreement used by Pronuptia. Pronuptia, perhaps disconcerted over the prospect of having its entire scheme of franchising
throughout the Common Market declared illegal and void, applied
for negative clearance on April 22, 1983, under article 2 of Commis22 Id.
"2 Id.
24 Id.
25' Id.
26 Id.
Ioot.

at
at
at
at.
at

16,442-43 (opinion of Advocate General 13.VerLoren an Thernaat).
16,438.
16,440-41.
16,441.
16,440-41. The third question of the Bundesgerichshof was thus rendered
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sion regulation 17, or exemption under Article 85(3) of the EEC
Treaty.
The standard form franchise contract considered by the Commission was essentially the same, although somewhat more complete
than the agreement considered by the Court ofJustice. The obligations placed on the franchisor were identical to those listed above,
except arguably for the possibility of company-owned outlets opening within the territory of the franchisee. 27 The obligations placed
upon the franchisee included all of the items listed above, with the
additional requirements that the franchisee (i) order at least fifty percent of its estimated sales in advance according to a fixed timetable,
and (ii) carry a full line of items listed in the catalogue of the
franchisor. 28 Further, the contract considered by the Commission
specifically allowed the franchisee to (i) obtain Pronuptia products
from any other franchise in the network, (ii) establish its own retail
price in spite of recommendations or advertised prices of the
franchisor, 29 and (iii) purchase goods not connected with the essential object of the franchise business from suppliers of its choice, subject to ex post vetting by the franchisor. Finally, the post-termination
covenant not to compete was mitigated to allow post-termination
competition if the franchisee had (i) been in business more than ten
years, (ii) had discharged its contractual obligations, and (iii) did not
30
use accumulated know-how on behalf of a competing network.
The Commission examined each of the clauses of the Pronuptia'
agreement in light of the Court ofJustice's decision, concluding that
most of the Pronuptia agreement conformed with Article 85(1). The
Commission found only two clauses of the agreement that had the
potential to adversely affect competition within the Common Market:
the clauses granting exclusivity to the franchisee for a given sales
territory, and the "location clause" obligating the franchisee to operate only from approved premises. The Commission recognized that
these clauses, when juxtaposed, might hinder intrabrand competition among franchisees. 3 ' However, under the powers granted to
27 It is not altogether clear whether this possibility exists or not because of the loose

usage by the Commission and the Court of the distinction between "exclusive" licenses
and "sole" licenses. The former excludes all other tradename users from the territory,
including the franchisor, while the latter allows the possibility of the franchisor to sell
directly into the territory. Compare Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgalis, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 16,436 with Commission Decision of 17 December 1986, in proceedings under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, (IV/30,937 - Pronuptia), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39,
4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,040 (1986).
28 Pronuptia, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) at 40-41, pt. 11, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 12,040, pt. 11.
2) Id. At the request of the Commission, these allowances were added to the agreement originally submitted to the Commission and presumably were a prerequisite to exemption or negative clearance.
'So Id.
3' Id. at 45, pt. 28, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,044, pt. 28.
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the Commission by Article 85(3), the Commission ruled that even
these clauses, in the context of franchising, merited an exemption
from the prohibition of Article 85(1).32
C.

The Facts of the Yves Rocher Commission Decision

On the same day that the Commission released its decision on
the Pronuptia network's application for, negative clearance or exemption, the Commission rendered a decision regarding the Yves
Rocher franchise system.3 3 Yves Rocher had applied to the Commission for negative clearance under Article 2 of Commission Regulation 17 on January 15, 1985, concerning its system of standard form
franchise contracts for the retailing of cosmetics in various countries
of the Common Market.
Yves Rocher is one of Europe's leading cosmetic producers,
marketing in fifty countries as well as having fifteen wholly-owned
subsidiaries abroad. It maintains a mail order network of some ten
million customers. In 1970 Yves Rocher developed a system of
franchised retail outlets known as "Yves Rocher Beauty Centres,"
now comprised of 1000 outlets.3 4 While the franchised outlets claim
to provide beauty treatments, all but a small
proportion of their turn35
over is from retail sales of cosmetics.
The Yves Rocher franchise agreement submitted to the Com*mission provided that the franchisor would (i) offer assistance to the
franchisee in the form of training, procedures, purchasing, publicity,3 6 and (ii) grant the franchisee an exclusive geographic territory
enforced by refusing to allow another outlet-either franchised or
company-owned-to be established within the territory. The
franchisor reserved the right, however, to sell within the territory by
37
means other than a sales outlet (e.g. through mail orders).
The franchisee, on the other hand,, would retain its legal independence and would be obligated to (i) carry on its business only at
the site chosen by the franchisor, (ii) maintain a uniform shop layout
and trading method, (iii) submit all promotional materials to the
franchisor for prior approval, (iv) sell exclusively Yves Rocher
branded products except for certain accessories approved by the
franchisor, (v) refrain from assigning or transferring its rights without the franchisor's consent, (vi) pay an initial licensing fee plus a
yearly share of publicity costs, (vii) maintain business confidences,
(viii) refrain from competing with Yves Rocher within the franchisee's territory for the duration of the contract plus one year there32 Id. at 47, pt. 38, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,046, pt. 38.
33 30 O.J EuR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 49, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,047.
34 Id. at 49, pt. 2, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,048, pt. 2.
",5Id. at 51, pt. 15, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,049, pt. 15.
3 Id. at 52, pt. 23, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,050, pt. 23.

37 Id. at 51, pt. 19, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,050, pt. 19.
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after, and (ix) refrain from selling branded products to
nonfranchised resellers. 38 The contract specifically allowed the franchisee to purchase or sell Yves Rocher branded products among
other franchised outlets.3 9 Furthermore, the contract40specifically allowed complete freedom in estabiishing retail prices.
Predictably, the Commission examined the Yves Rocher
franchise agreement in much the same fashion that it examined the
Pronuptia agreement, and, indeed, reached the same conclusion.
Again, the Commission found that the juxtapositioning of the location clause and territorial exclusivity might lead to results affecting
competition in violation of Article 85(1). However, the remoteness
of the possibility of an adverse impact, as well as the positive benefits
which the Yves Rocher agreement had to offer the consumer led the
Commission to grant an 4 exemption under Article 85(3) to these
clauses of the agreement. '
IV. The Application of European Community Competition Law to
Areas Related to Franchising
Although the consideration of franchising per se is a novelty for
the Court ofJustice and Commission, many of the legal issues arising
in franchising have been examined in great detail in analogous situations. The obvious parallels between franchising and exclusive distribution agreements, selective distribution arrangements, and
licensing agreements make examination of the Community law in
these areas useful in understanding the current developments in
franchising. Other general issues, such as the subject matter jurisdiction of the Community institutions over franchising and the policy
towards small and medium-sized enterprises, have been more or less
conclusively resolved over the years and their relevance to franchising is a matter of application rather than analogy.
A.

Exclusive DistributionAgreements

Inasmuch as a franchise agreement often contains exclusive
purchasing rights, exclusive supply rights, and territoriality, 'retail
franchising can be compared with retail distribution systems. 4 2 Indeed, prior to the Court's Pronuptia opinion, speculation had arisen
'18 Id. at 51-53, pts. 17-22, 24-31,4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,049-52, pts. 17-

22, 24-31.
31) Id. at 53, pt. 28, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,051, pt. 28. This provision was

included at the request of the Commission, effective December 1, 1986.
40 Id. at 53, pt. 30, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,051, pt. 30. At the request of
the Commission, Yves Rocher issued a circular to its franchisees stressing this freedom
and that published price lists were to be considered purely recommendations.
41 Id. at 56-57, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,055-56.
42 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris lmgard Schillgalis. 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

14,245, at 16,447-48 (1986).

N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 13

as to whether the Community's regulations concerning distribution
agreements might conclusively control franchising as well. 4 3

While

the Court and Commission have since decided to regulate franchises
separately from distribution agreements, it is clear that a great deal
of their theoretical analysis of franchising was derived from their experience with distribution agreements.
Exclusive distribution agreements have been often commended
by the EEC Commission as beneficial contractual relations. In such
agreements, a supplier appoints a dealer as the sole distributor of its
goods within a defined territory, and, in many cases, the dealer
agrees to sell only the supplier's goods to the exclusion of competing
brands. The Commission has stated that such arrangements lead to
improved distribution through concentration of sales activities, intensification of marketing, rationalization of distribution, and circumvention of linguistic and legal barriers in transnational
distribution. In general, the consumer is perceived as receiving a
"fair share of the resulting benefits" of improved distribution and
increased interbrand competition. 44 Specific legislation, Commission Regulations 83/83 and 84/83, has been provided to exempt distribution agreements from the procedural requirements and
sanctions of EEC competition rules, and even those agreements not
under such regulations are often granted
qualifying for exemption
45
individual clearance.
Regulation 83/83 is applicable to exclusive dealing agreements.
Under its provisions, even though exclusive distribution agreements
for geographic territories are per se restrictions of competition as
defined by Article 85(1),46 they are acceptable and permitted so long
as the complete arrangements meet the criteria set forth in Regulation 83/83. Parties to these agreements need not notify the Commission of their activities, and may assume their exemption under
Article 85(3).
Regulation 83/83 allows exclusive dealing arrangements to include certain ancillary restrictions on competition without forfeiting
the exemption. These include, among other things, restrictions on
43 See, e.g., Goebel, The Uneasy Fate of Franchising under EEC Antitrust Laws, 10 EUR. L.
RE'. 87, 101 (1985); Adams, Franchising and Antitrust in the UK. and European Community, 26
ANTITRUST BULL. 815, 832 (1981).

44 Preamble to Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1983/83, On the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 26 OJ.
2730 (1983) [hereinafter
EUR. COMM. (No. , 173) 1-2, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
Regulation 1983/83].
45 Prior to 1983, the regulation governing exclusive distribution agreements was
Commission Regulation (EEC) 67/67, On the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to
Certain Categories of Exclusive Dealing Agreements, 10 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. 57) 849, 2
2727 (1967) [hereinafter Regulation 67/67].
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
46; See Gijlstra & Murphy, Distribtion Systems and EEC Coimpetition Law: The Law as it
Stands, 1976 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 81, 87 (citing Commission decisions during

1965-67, prior to the first block exemption for distribution agreements).
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the supplier's distribution of goods to users within the dealer's territory, and restrictions or obligations on the dealer not to manufacture
or distribute competing products, to refrain from active marketing
outside of the dealer's territory, to carry a full line of the supplier's
goods, to protect trademark rights, to provide promotion, and to
47
purchase exclusively from the supplier.
Regulation 84/83, in a similar fashion, allows parties to a distribution agreement to restrict competition by requiring the dealer to
purchase its requirements solely from the supplier to the exclusion
of the supplier's competitors. The Regulation allows ancillary restrictions on the supplier with regard to competing with the dealer, and
upon the dealer with regard to manufacturing or distributing competing goods, carrying a full line of goods, maintaining a minimum
quantity of goods, protecting trademarks, and promotion. 48 Both
Regulation 83/83 and 84/83 allow ancillary noncompetition covenants, so long as their duration is limited to the lifetime of the agree49
ment and not'beyond.
The Commission's posture towards the restrictions on competition inherent in distribution agreements is, to a great extent, permissive. There are certain restrictive practices, however, which the
regulations clearly forbid. The prime example of such a restrictive
practice is a distribution agreement which gives a dealer absolute territorial protection. An agreement may protect a dealer's territory by
forbidding others from actively marketing within that territory, or by
forbidding the supplier from supplying another dealer or even a user
within that territory. Nevertheless, an agreement that hinders the
import of the supplier's goods into the dealer's territory by a third
party, or hinders the dealer's export of the goods from the territory,
and thus erects a barrier to the free movement of goods within the
Community, will certainly invoke the ire of the Commission. 50 Such
absolute territorial protection may be attempted overtly by means of
an export ban, or, as the Commission has recognized, may be disguised in schemes requiring dealers who export outside of their territory to pay compensatory payments, 5' prohibitions on cross47 Regulation 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) art. 2, at 2, 2 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) $ 2730B, at 1893.
48 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1984/83, On the Application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 173) art. 2, at 5, 8, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

2733C, at 1909 (1983) [hereinafter

Regulation 1984/83].
4) Regulation 83/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) recital 8, at 2, 2 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2730, at 1891. See generally VandenHove, The New Commission Regulations No.
1983/83 and 1984/83, 1984 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 41.

5O See, e.g., Commission Decision of 14 December 1985, relating to a proceeding
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.809 -John Deere), 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L
35) 58 (1985), where a $2 million ECU fine was imposed on the supplier for enforcing an
export restriction on the dealers. See also, Gijlstra & Murphy, supra note 46. at 93-94.
51 See generallv N. GREEN, COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS & COMPETITION I.AW: PRACTICE &
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deliveries (sales amongst dealers), 52 threats of invoking national unfair competition laws to prevent territorial infringement, 5 3 limitations of warranties or repair policies on articles imported from
another territory,5 4 and, in conjunction with other restrictions, restriction on advertising or seeking customers outside of a dealer's
55
territory.
Likewise, the Commission's regulation of exclusive distribution
agreements disfavors resale price maintenance, customer restrictions, and conditions of sale restrictions. 56 These restraints on competition, if included in a distribution agreement, remove the
agreement from the "safe harbor" of the Regulations and require
the parties to seek individual exemption or clearance.
B.

Selective Distribution Systems

Selective distribution, namely the practice of supplying only
dealers who fulfil qualitative, or sometimes quantitative criteria, will
always be associated with the business format franchise. 57 Selective
distribution systems may have no anti-competitive effects since generally a dealer has no absolute right to deal with any particular supplier. However, if the selection criteria are arbitrary, or the
limitation on the number of dealers is deemed to be detrimental to
the consumer, the arrangement is subject to the competition rules of
58
the Community.
Commission rules distinguish between "qualitative" and "quantitative" selection, allowing the first but not the second. If "resellers
are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature...
and such conditions are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion," 59 then no violation of Article 85 exists. Several general conditions must be met for
"safe" qualitative restrictions: (i) the product must be of a type appropriate to selective distribution such as products of a complex or
PROCEDURE IN T1HEU.K. AND

E.E.C. (1986) (information on source available from author);

D~cision de la Commision du 27 juin 1967 relative a une procedure au titr6 de I'article 85
du trait6 CEE (IV/223 - Transocean Marine Paint Association), 9 .J. EUR. COMM. (No.
163) 10 (1967).
52 See, e.g., Heintz van Landewyck S~rl v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
3125, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8687 (1980).
53 See, e.g., Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import S.A., 17 Recueil 949, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8149 (1971).
54 ETA Fabriques d'Ebauches S.A. v. DK Investments S.A., 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,276 (1985).
5' N. GREEN, supra note 51, at 463.
5( Regulation 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) recital 8, at 2, 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 2730, at 1891.
57 Adams, supra note 43, at 822.
58 Chard, The Economics of Exchisive Distmibutorship Arrangements with Special Reference to

EEC Competition PolicY, 25 ANIT'RUST BULL. 405, 426 (1980).
5) Commission Decision of 15 December 1975, relating to a proceeding under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/847 - SABA), 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19, 25 (1976).
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technical nature, those relying upon a brand name or image, or those
requiring pre- or post- sale servicing; (ii) the qualitative obligation
must not exceed that which is essential for the system as a whole; and
(iii) the criteria must not be discriminatory or arbitrary. 60 Such criteria require the undertaking of a market analysis, but generally requirements related to personnel training, stocking of inventory,
maintenance, shop appearance, and after-sales service have been
found acceptable qualitative criteria.
Quantitative restrictions, those which impose numerical limits
on the number of dealers with access to a market, are considered by
the Court of Justice and Commission to be in violation of Article
85(1) because they tend to restrict consumer choice and discriminate
among equally qualified dealers. The Commission's recognition that
a quantitative restriction may nevertheless be necessary for the sake
of quality has led that body to grant a number of exemptions in this
area, and the Commission has been criticized for its somewhat inconsistent reasoning. 61 For example, when BMW 62 defended its quantitative selection criteria as necessary for its marketing strategy, the
Commission agreed, holding that the restrictions were indispensible
and contributed to the rationalization of the sale and servicing of the
product, and thus better served the public. 6 3 Another defense,
raised in the Guerlain case, 64 that quantitative restrictions were required to discourage free-riders-those who sell a distributed product more cheaply than other dealers by relying upon the other
dealer's promotional efforts 6 5 -proved unsuccessful, perhaps because the Commission approved of the increased price competition
which free-riders make possible. 66 Needless to say, it remains difficult to draw general conclusions from the Commission's decisions to
date.
C.

Licensing Agreements

A franchise agreement may be considered a licensing agreement
to the extent that the franchisor grants the franchisee the right to use
its tradename, irademark, and confidential know-how. 67 More pre60 N. GREEN, supra note 51, at 521-22.
61 See NV L'Oreal v. PVBA De Nieuwe AMCK, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8715 (1980); Chard, supra note
58, at 427; Gijlstra & Murphy, supra note 46, at 115.
62 Commission Decision of 13 December 1974, relating to a proceeding under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/14.650 - Bayerische Motoren Werke AG), 18 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 29) 1 (1975).
6' Gijlstra & Murphy, supra note 46, at 113.
64 Procureur v. Giry & Guerlain, S.A., 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2327, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8712 (1980).

65

N.

GREEN,

supra note 51, at 523.

6 i For a fuller discussion of the role of the free-rider in franchising, see text accompanying notes 115-117.
67 BI-ACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 592 (5th ed. 1979).
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cisely, franchising has been described as the licensing of a Summe
von Leistungen, or a bundle of rights, wherein the rights subject to
protection are the essence of the franchising agreement. 6 8 As in a
licensing agreement for a trademark, the franchisor conditions the
granting of the license for protectable rights and know-how on the
uniform projection of the franchise image and operation, and agreements typically contain ancillary obligations to respect and assist in
the defense of the franchisor's intellectual property rights, as well as
to maintain confidences. 69
In the EEC, trademark and tradename licensing remains in the
formative stages; much of the policy relevant to them has been developed unilaterally by the Commission and remains judicially unconfirmed. 70 The leading decision setting forth the Commission's policy
is the Campari case, 71 where the licensing arrangement was composed of a system of international exclusive territorial licenses supplemented by a promise of the licensor not to compete in the
territory of the licensees, as well as a ban on direct exports by licensees into other EEC countries. In an analysis similar to that described above regarding exclusive distributorships, the Commission
found the arrangement in violation of Article 85(1), but exempted
the exclusivity restrictions. 72 The Commission did not permit the
export ban, although it did approve a less restrictive alternative of
restraining the licensees from actively marketing in the territory of
other licensees. 7 3 The Commission considered the territorial allocation and protection to be necessary for the enjoyment of sufficient
returns on investment in the licensed product, and thus a desirable
improvement in production; "none of the licensees and in all
probability no other undertaking would have been prepared to make
the investment necessary for a significant increase in sales ...if it
was not sure of being protected from competition from other licen' '74
sees or Campari-Milano itself.
Although the main thrust of the Campari decision involved the
exclusivity provisions, additional provisions relevant to franchising
were dealt with by the Commission. The Commission held the following clauses to be outside Article 85(1) or exemptable under Arti68 Id. (citing M. MACK, NEUERE VERTRAGS-SYSTEMS IN DER BDR 25 (1973)).
69 Goebel, supra note 43, at I11.
70 Blaisse, Patent Licensing in the European Community: An Assessment of General Developments and the Present Position, 1985 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 27, 28.
71 Commission Decision of 23 December 1977, relating to proceedings under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/171, IV/856, IV/172, IV/117, IV/28.173 - Campari), 21 O.J.

EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69 (1977). For a discussion of this case, see Joilet, Territorial &
Exclusive Trademark Licensing Under the EEC Law of Competition, 15 INT'L REv. INDUYS.PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 21, 29 (1984) (information on source available from author).
72 Campari, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 71.
73 Id. at 76.
74 Id.
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cle 85(3): quality control measures including quantitative selection of
licensees, exclusive purchasing obligations for certain secret raw
materials, a covenant of confidentiality extending in duration beyond
the life of the agreement, and a prohibition on assignment or sub75
licensing.
D. Jurisdictionof the European Community

A threshold question to the application of EEC competition
rules to a franchise system is a jurisdictional question. Article 85 applies where an agreement "may affect trade between Member
76
States." The Court has explained that:
Community law covers any agreement or any practice which is capable of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member
States, in particular by partitioning the national markets or by affecting the structure of competition within the common market. On the
other hand, conduct the effects of which are confined to the territory
of a single Member State is governed by the national legal order.

Thus, a franchise system operating completely within a single Member State may well be free from Article 85 competition law. On the
more Memother hand, a network of franchise agreements in two or
77
ber States would certainly fall under EEC jurisdiction.
Caution must be exercised, however, in concluding that a
franchise network with only superficial domestic effects is outside of
EEC jurisdiction. In a 1967 case, the Court held that jurisdiction of
Article 85 with regard to distribution agreements was determined by
examining the agreements "either in isolation or together with
others in the economic and legal context in which they were concluded." ' 78 Thus, by analogy, for franchise systems one must conduct a somewhat sophisticated market analysis to determine whether
the aggregate effect of all similar systems for a given product, 79including its substitutes, may affect trade between Member States.
A further complication is added if the franchise system includes
a ban on exports or other measures to prevent parallel trading.
While a ban on exports from one Member State to another certainly
75 N. GREEN, supra note 51, at 724-25.
7(; Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, 1979 E. Common Ct. J. Rep. 1869, 1899,
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8524, at 7459 (1979).
77 Goebel, supra note 43, at 95-96. See Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export
8149
S.A., 17 Recueil 949, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
(1971) (non-European distributor affecting trade within the EEC with its distribution system in France and Belgium).
78 S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, 13 Recueil 525, [1967- 1970
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH). 8053, at 7805 (1967).
79 The Commission need not show that an agreement has affected trade between
Member States, but merely that it may. See N. GREEN, supra note 51, at 240, for examples
of aggregate effects within a single Member State which have been found to affect trade
between Member States, including uniform export prices, agreements not to supply foreign buyers, or where efficient dealers are scarce.
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affects trade between Member States, even a ban on a franchise network operating within a single country from exporting to markets
outside the EEC may "affect trade" within the EEC. Again, a rather
sophisticated market analysis must be conducted to determine
whether such goods, once exported, might have a "reasonable
probability" of reentering the Common Market through
reimportation.8 0
Finally, a location clause prohibiting a franchisee from setting
up a business other than in a single, preordained location can affect
interstate competition by hindering the franchisee's establishment in
another Member State, even though the franchise network operates
solely within a single Member State.8 '
E.

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

Franchises, as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), receive preferential treatment in the EEC, including lenient application
of the Community's competition laws. 8 2 For example, Article 85

does not even apply to a franchise network, unless the network is of a
size sufficient to "appreciably" affect trade. This so-called de
minimis exception was first established by the Court in 1966, where a
firm with only 0.05% of the relevant market share was found to affect
the market so insignificantly that Article 85 could not be applied.
This view was formalized by the Commission in its Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance. 8 3 The current version of this Notice
indicates the Commission's view that agreements between undertakings engaged in the production or distribution of goods or the provision of services do not appreciably affect trade if:
(i) the goods or services which are the subject of the agreement together with the participating undertakings' other goods or
services which are considered by users to be equivalent in view of
their characteristics, price and intended use, do not represent more
than 5% of the total market of such goods or services in the area of
the Common Market affected by the agreement, and
(ii) the aggregate annual turnover of the participating under80 Commission Decision of 23 December 1977, relating to proceedings under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/171, IV/856, IV/172, IV/1I7, IV/28.173 - Campari), 21 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69 (1977); Commission Decision of 21 December 1976, relating to
a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/5715 - Junghans), 20 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 30) 10 (1976); Commission Decision of 15 December 1975, relating to a
proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/847 - SABA), 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 28) 19 (1975). The effect may be especially acute if the export ban involves European
Free Trade Association countries.
81

82
83

N. GREEN, supra note 51, at 502.
Statement by Peter Sutherland, 19 BULL. EUR.
13 oJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 64) 1 (1970).

COMMUNiTY

No. 1, 26 (1986).
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takings does not exceed 200 million ECU. 8 4

A similar exception to the application of Article 85 has been suggested with regard to agreements necessary for the penetration of
new markets, especially for SMEs. The basis of this contention is
found in the Second Transocean Marine Paint Association Decision,8 5 where the Commission made the renewal of its exemption of
certain measures providing territorial protection conditioned upon a
showing that the Association, comprised of SMEs, had yet to establish itself in the relevant market.8 6 As noted above, the Commission
in the Campari licensing decision 8 7 applied a similar rationale by
holding that territorial allocation and a degree of protection were
necessary to prompt investment of licensees into new markets. This
exemption is merely temporary, lasting only as long as an enterprise
is engaging in those initial stages of activity that constitute market
88
penetration.
While exemption from the competition rules may be available to
the franchise system, either through lack of jurisdiction, de minimis
status, or the penetration of new markets, it may be more cost-effective to forego the market analysis required for each of these, and
abide by the rules instead. As will be seen, the Commission's attitude towards franchising is favorable, and only in exceptional circumstances should a violation of its permissive rules be necessary.
V.

Community Competition Law Applied to Franchising

Typical franchise agreements, such as those found in the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher decisions, contain a number of clauses which
could prevent, restrict, or distort competition. Since Article 85(1) is
drafted so as to prohibit, unless specifically exempted, all agreements which "prevent, restrict, or distort" competition, it is crucial
to examine each clause of a franchise agreement to assess its affect
on competition and to determine what exceptions, if any, are available. Fortunately, the Court and the Commission have provided
practical and quite detailed guidance for the analysis of most retail
distribution franchise agreements. The following section addresses
the competition aspects of a variety of clauses typically found in
franchise agreements and analyzes them in terms of specific Court or
Commission guidance or lack thereof.
84 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 231) 2, pt. 7 (1986), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2700, at 1853-3 (1986).
85 Commission Decision of 21 December 1973, concerning proceedings under Article 85 of the Treaty (IV/223 - Transocean Marine Paint Association), 17 O. J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 19) 18 (1973).
86 Gijlstra & Murphy, supra note 46, at 98.
87 See supra text accompanying note 71.
88 DZcision de la Commision du 27 juin 1967 relative a une procedure au titr6 de

I'article 85 du trait6 CEE (IV/223 - Transocean Marine Paint Association), 9
COMM. (No. 163) 10 (1967).

.J. EUR.
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Generalities

Before addressing specific clauses from franchise agreements,
certain observations can be made regarding the Court and Commission's general attitude towards franchising. These generalizations
apply to most franchise agreements, especially in instances where
there is no specific legal guidance for the contracting parties.
Restrictions of competition aside, the institutions of the Community favor the concept of franchising and are seeking to accommodate it into the economic infrastructure of the Common Market.
Franchising is viewed as a form of business with a higher-than-average success rate, an efficient means of penetrating new markets, an
opportunity for employment, a price-depressing system, and a
means of providing mass quantities of consistent quality goods to a
wide range of consumers, irrespective of national boundaries.8 9 Indeed, the Community views it as an "inextricably-linked component
90
of tomorrow's Europe."
In spite of the favor in which franchising is viewed, the Commission has the propensity for reacting slowly to innovative marketing
systems. In this regard, the criticism of U.S. antitrust policy-making
offered by Assistant Attorney General McGrath is equally well applied to the Commission. Enforcement agencies often forbid even
tactics neutral as to their effect on competition out of a fear of setting
unfavorable precedents. 9' This excessive caution by these agencies
discourages experimentation.
The Commission is well aware of this criticism. It has observed
that "clarity and efficiency in implementing competition policy is essential to increase the legal security of firms operating in the Community." 9 2 Especially with franchising, it seems that the Commission
has tried to become more forthcoming; one of the prime motivations
behind the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher decisions was the intention to
provide, as stated by Commissioner Sutherland, "parties to such
93
agreements with the necessary legal certainty."
Business enterprises demand more than certainty of antitrust
laws; they demand flexibility. 94 Arguably, the franchising decisions
provided by the Commission have fulfilled the former, but has the
Commission addressed the latter? Flexibility requires rules of law
89 Goebel, supra note 43, at 92; Statement by Peter Sutherland, supra note 82, at 26.
90 Revitalizing the Community, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY, supp. 1, at 14 (1986).
1t1Goebel, supra note 43, at 91 (citing McGrath, U'S. Antitrust Policy and Export Cartels
Panel Discussion, in FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE ch. 16 (B. Hawke ed. 1984).
92 19 15 Rep. on Competition Policy, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY 6, part 2, pt. 2.182 (1986).

93 Statement by Peter Sutherland, supra note 82, at 27.
94 Lang, EEC Competition Policies: A Status Report, in ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80s: EUROPEAN & AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON COMPETITION & INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 26 (F.
Rowe, F. Jacobs & M.Joelson ed. 1980). He further points out that these two notions are
essentially mutually exclusive.
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which are adaptable to the particular circumstances of a given
franchise system. And, indeed, the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher decisions do provide two guidelines for the flexible application of the
rules of competition law to franchising. The advent of this accommodating approach to antitrust regulation of franchises is the most
important accomplishment of these two recent European Commission decisions.
The first of these rules of application is that Article 85(1)'s prohibition should be tempered by the unique requirements of business
confidentiality. Those clauses of the franchise agreement, albeit restricting or distorting competition, which are "essential to prevent
the know-how made available and the assistance given by the
franchisor from benefiting competitors," are "inherent in the very
existence in [the franchisor's] right in its intellectual creations and
fall outside the scope of . . . Article 85(1)." ' 95 The second rule of
application relates to the essential element of franchising: the
tradename or trademark reputation. The Commission has held that
"clauses that provide for the control essential to preserve the common identity and reputation of the network trading under the
franchisor's name" are also outside of the prohibition of Article
85(1).96

The Commission's approach to franchising from a policy perspective is somewhat similar to the U.S. doctrine of ancillary restraints, that an agreement involving an otherwise illicit restraint of
trade may nevertheless be legal if that agreement is subordinate to a
legitimate purpose of the contract. 9 7 The Commission has identified
the essential elements of franchising, and excludes those clauses necessary for their achievement from Article 85(1). While this approach
is not entirely new to the Commission,"8 the franchising decisions
represent the boldest use of the doctrine to date. 99
More important than the novelty, however, is the maximized
flexibility that the ancillary restraint doctrine offers. Parties under95 Commission Decision of 17 December 1986, in proceedings under Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty, (IV/30,937 - Pronuptia), 30 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39, 43, pt. 25, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

10,854, at 12,042-43, pt. 25 (1986); see also Commission Deci-

sion of 17 December 1986, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
(IV/31,428-32 - Yves Rocher), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) 49, 54, pt. 40, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at 12,053, pt. 40 (1986).
96 Pronuptia, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) at 43, pt. 25(ii), 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 12,043, pt. 25(ii).
!7 A restraint is legal when "the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main
purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of
the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of
those fruits by the other party." United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
282 (6th Cir. 1898).
.)8 See, e.g., Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
1063, 11974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8,241 (1974).
1)1)See imfra text accompanying notes 147-62.
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taking a franchise agreement, if reasonably certain that a trade-restricting clause is necessary to attain one of the legitimate ends cited
by the Commission, may employ that clause with a degree of confidence that it will not violate Article 85(1). A contract can be drafted
in such a way so as to protect the varying needs of the multi-dimensional franchising industry. The parties may authorize certain restraints on competition in the knowledge that, should question ever
arise, the Commission will endeavor to understand any relationship
which may exist between the restraint and an essential element of
franchising.
B.

Territoriality and ParallelImports

Territorial restrictions exist where the franchisor restricts the
franchisee's sale of the product to particular geographic markets.
Often, territorial restraints are coupled with exclusive franchises,
where the franchisor agrees to supply no other franchisee within the
territory, and sometimes agrees to refrain from operating there itself. There are two general types of territorial restrictions. In open
territorial restrictions the franchisee is restrained from actively seeking customers outside of its territory, but may sell to any customer
who comes into the territory. In closed, or absolute, territorial restrictions, the franchisee can sell only to customers who actually reside within the territory. This distinction is fundamental in the
application of EEC competition law to franchising.
Territorial restraints may be accomplished directly by a contractual clause detailing the geographic market available to a franchisee
or the customers it may serve. Or, where the economic profit threshold for the transport of a product is small, territoriality may be
achieved indirectly through a location clause-a clause specifying the
location of a franchisee's shop and forbidding it from opening a second shop elsewhere. Similarly, for some products, a mere restriction
on advertising outside of a defined territory is sufficient to create a
de facto territorial restraint in the distribution of the product.
Territoriality serves a number of purposes in franchising systems. Franchisees may insist that territorial restrictions be placed on
all franchisees within the system so as to protect each individual franchisee's exclusivity. The franchisees fear that "free-riders"-parasite
franchisees utilizing the promotional or servicing efforts of other
franchisees offering the same brandl°°-may skim profitable accounts and undermine returns on investments.
Benefits flow to the franchisor as well. Where service or installation of a product is necessary, the franchisor, knowing that a franchisee who did not sell the product will likely not service or install it
100 Gyselen, Iertical Restraintsin the Distribution Process: Strengths and Wi'eaknesses of the Free
Rider Rationale Under EEC Competition Law, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 647, 648 (1984).
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as carefully as the profiting seller, can protect the franchise's goodwill by allowing sales only to customers within a geographic proximity of the franchisee. Further, the franchisor may consider territorial
restraints necessary to attract new franchisees and to induce them to
exploit the depths of their markets without fear of risking their initial
investment to already established intrabrand competitors. The
franchisor may choose to utilize territorial restraints as a means of
establishing orderly markets, facilitating estimation of production requirements or regional advertising campaigns. Finally, in view of the
fact that the Common Market is not yet fully integrated, franchisors
may utilize territorial restraints in an effort to protect areas with high
profit margins. Prices vary from one Member State to another based
on factors such as differences in standards of living, price elasticities,
promotional costs, efficiencies of production and distribution structure, availability of substitutes, and varying legislation and tax burdens. These .differences may prompt a franchisor to attempt to
restrain sales across borders by means of closed territorial restrictions from lower-priced Member States to customers in higherpriced States.
Both the Pronuptia and the Yves Rocher franchising agreements
contained clauses creating territorial restraints in conjunction with
exclusive supply obligations. The Pronuptia agreement granted the
franchisee an "exclusive right to use the mark 'Pronuptia de Paris'
... for a particular territory outlined in a map attached to the agreement, as well as the right to advertise in that territory." It also required the franchisee to sell merchandise only from the shop
specified in the agreement.' 0 1 The Yves Rocher agreement similarly
granted the franchisee an exclusive area defined in the contract for
the use of the franchisor's identifying mark, guaranteeing that no
other shop would be allowed within that area. Additionally, the
agreement defined the exact location of the franchisee's shop and
02
forbade transfer of the shop or opening of a second shop.
The Court, in its consideration of the Pronuptia agreement,
found that the juxtaposition of the location clause' 0 3 and the exclusivity granted by the franchisor resulted in a market partitioning between the franchisor and the franchisee or among the franchisees,
and thus constituted a restriction of competition contrary to Article
85(l).104 The Court made several interesting observations which
101 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245, at 16,436 (1986).
102 Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 51, pts. 18-19, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 12,050, pts. 18-19.
103 The location clause was considered to have two functions; inasmuch as it contributed to the preservation of the reputation of the identity of the franchise network, it did
not violate Art. 85(1). However, to the extent it contributed to the territorial scheme, it
did. See t-onuptia de Paris v. Schillgalis, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16.439.
104 Id. at 16,439-40.
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provided guidance for the Commission in their consideration of the
same agreement. First, the Court noted that the territorial restraints
restricted competition solely within the network, reinforcing the fact
that Article 85(1) sometimes prohibits vertical restraints with purely
intrabrand effects. Second, the Court noted that the territoriality in
the Pronuptia case was prohibited under Article 85(1) "since it concern[ed] a mark that is already well known." 1 0 5 While the Court
gave no further elaboration of this, it appears to be a reference to the
clearance available to enterprises implementing measures necessary
for the penetration of new markets.' 0 6 Finally, the Court noted that
territoriality, even among franchisees all operating within a single
Member State, is capable of affecting trade between Member States
per se to the extent that territorial restraints prevent 7 franchisees
0
from setting themselves up in another Member State.
The fact that the Court found territoriality to be caught by Article 85(1) must be viewed in light of the generalizations made by the
Court; namely contractual clauses necessary to safeguard know-how
and to preserve network reputation were outside of Article 85(1).
The Court, with little economic analysis, viewed territoriality to be
"far from necessary" to achieve these safeguards. Although hypothetical to the case before the Court, the broad language of the
Court appears to have overlooked those instances where the failure
of franchises harms network reputation, and to have failed to note
that territorial protection is instrumental in preventing these failures. The Court did, however, recognize that territoriality may be
essential to the operation of a functional franchise system, noting
that new franchisees presumably would not invest in the system without the protection from other franchisees, but left the consideration
of this to the Commission under its exemption powers of Article
85(3).108

The Commission agreed with the Court that the territorial allocation and the location clause constituted restraints of trade prohibited by Article 85(1). However, in both the Pronuptia and Yves
Rocher agreements, it granted these territorial restraints an exemption under Article 85(3) on the basis that the distribution networks
improved the production and distribution of the products concerned. Specifically, the Commission. accepted the argument that
territoriality contributes to inducing franchisees to exploit the
depths of their markets, fosters efficient market organization, and attracts and protects new franchisees.I" Furthermore, following the
105 Id.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.

Promiplia de Paris v. Schillgalis, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,440.
Id. at 16,439-40; see also Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 57, pts. 58-6 1,
4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,056, pts. 58-61.
lol Commission Decision of' 17 December 1986, in proceedings tinder Article 85 of
107
108
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Court's analysis, the Commission noted that while territorial restraints hamper intrabrand competition, 110 they contribute to "intensifying interbrand competition,"'
and presumably the benefits
to the latter were perceived as outweighing any harm to the former.
The territoriality of the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher franchise
agreements can be characterized as open territorial restraints with
solely vertical, intrabrand restrictions of competition. Such restraints are generally acceptable to the Commission, although notification is required to gain the legal certainty of an exemption.
Closed, or absolute, territorial restraints, although not present in the
Pronuptia and Yves Rocher franchise systems, are contrary to EEC
competition policy. Consequently, a franchise agreement containing
such restraints would certainly not be exempted from fines and possibly other sanctions.
In both the Pronuptia and the Yves Rocher Commission decisions, the Commission stressed that the territorial restraints contained in those agreements did not prevent the franchisees from
buying and selling the product amongst themselves irrespective of
territory," 2 and further, did not prevent customers residing in one
territory from purchasing the product from another territory.' 3
The prevention of either of these transactions would have constituted closed territorial restraints.
The Commission's position illustrates the sometimes paradoxical dual objectives of EEC competition law. On the one hand, the
Commission accepts that territoriality, while restraining intrabrand
competition, enhances the distribution process, yields benefits, and
is perhaps necessary to interbrand competition. On the other hand,
territoriality may be inimical to the unification of the Common Market, especially where territorial restraints coincide with national
boundaries. There are times when the possibility of sales to customers from another territory consitutes a "corrective factor for excessive prices imposed by an exclusive concession holder and should be
an element of price harmonization in a unified market having the
the EEC Treaty, (IV/30,937 - Pronuptia), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39, 45, pt. 28. 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,044, pt. 28 (1986); Yves Rocher; 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 8) at 56, pt. 58, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,055, pt. 58.
110 Pronuptia, 30 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39, 46, pt. 34, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.

(CCH) 10,854, at 12,045, pt. 34 (1986); Yves Rocher, 30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 57,
pt. 63, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,056, pt. 63.
111 Pronuptia, 30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. 1, 13) at 46, pt. 34, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 12,045, pt. 34; I'ves
Rocher, 30 0.J. EUR COMM. (No. L 8) at 57, pt. 58. 4 Common

Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,056, pt. 58.
112 Pronuptia, 30 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) at 47, pt. 37, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 12,046, pt. 37; I'ves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 58. pt. 64, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,056, pt. 64.
113 Pronuptia, 30 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) at 47, pt. 37, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 12,046, pt. 37; Yves Rocher, 30 0J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 58, pt. 64, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,056, pt. 64.
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same features as a single domestic market."'' 4 Similarly, export
bans and customer restrictions used by franchisors to protect national oligopolist structures from intercountry transactions, or to insulate profit margins in higher-priced member states, are justifiably
attacked by the Commission as anticompetitive and contrary to market integration."l 5 In these instances, the parallel importer, or the
free rider, is the "hero of the Commission" because he restores intrabrand price competition. 16
Yet the free rider, although furthering the above Community
goals, poses a dilemma to those who wish to encourage franchising
within the Community. While the free rider's activities harmonize
with one of franchising's major benefits, providing interbrand competition in a given market, they lessen another, that of allowing consumers access to uniform, dependable products. The free rider
increases competition and can bring lower prices to consumers, but
at the cost of undermining the franchisor's efforts to provide a full
range of products of uniform quality backed up by service capability.
By luring customers from the new or struggling franchisee's territory, the free rider leaves the franchisee weakened, ultimately weakening the interbrand competitive posture of the network as a whole.
If a franchise really presents economic advantages, the free rider's
long-term harmful effects should nevertheless be limited.
Whether the Commission can reconcile the paradox of these
policies is subject to debate. 1 7 The treatment of hinderance to parallel imports as a per se violation of competition law, however, is not
unreasonable in light of the fact that market integration is unquestionably fundamental to the Commission's mission. Where market
integration is paramount, export bans or closed territories are
anathema.
C.

Resale Price Maintenance and Suggested Retail Prices

The franchisor is inevitably concerned that its product is sold
with the proper pre- and post-sale service and installation, that inventory is offered in sufficient quantities, and that a full line of
choices is available to the consumer. Naturally, these requirements
are reflected in the franchisee's cost of business. Threatening the
franchisee under these conditions is the free rider, or the discount
house, who offers less service and range of inventory, but attracts
customers with cheaper prices. The consequent decline of services
114 COMMISSION OF TiE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POl,-

ICy pt. 46 (1973) (information on source available from author).
115 Chard, supra note 58, at 412.
I 10i Gyselen, supra note 100, at 649.
I 17 See, e.g., Chard, supra note 58, at 435 (arguing for more flexibility in the Commission's policy towards closed territoriality).
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and dissatisfaction of the franchisees results in a loss of the network's
goodwill and reputation.
One logical approach to the deleterious effects caused by pricecutters is to establish a system of retail price maintenance. In spite
of its apparent logic, resale price maintenance is virtually a per se
violation of Article 85(1) and is never exempted under Article 85(3).
Resale price maintenance has a number of potentially anticompetitive effects: it tends to maintain prices at a level where the most inefficient member of the network can survive and acts as a disincentive
to more efficient dealers; it negates price competition but fosters
nonprice competition (thus requiring the consumer to purchase
services which the consumer may not desire but are nonetheless tied
to the product), and it may foster collusion and other anticompetitive
practices between brand owners. " 18 The need to counteract free riders is an insufficient justification for these threats to competition.
In the Yves Rocher franchise agreement, the franchisor originally implemented a resale price maintenance scheme, although it
was never practiced.' ' 9 This was clearly a violation of Article 85(1),
and the Commission required, as a prerequisite to exemption, that
the franchisor delete those provisions and circulate a memo to the
franchisees to that effect. But the Commission is not concerned
solely with direct price maintenance; in its experience with distribution networks it has demonstrated a skepticism of recommended
price lists as well. Recommended prices are not a per se violation of
competition law. They do, however, tend to flatten prices to a uniform level, thereby potentially causing impermissible anticompetitive
effects, especially if the recommendations are accompanied by inducements or threats. Thus, schemes whereby the franchisee must
obtain the franchisor's permission to deviate from recommended
prices, or inform the franchisor of its intent to deviate, or where the
franchisor withholds supplies from deviators, withholds credit, or
merely disseminates memos encouraging compliance, may run afoul
of competition law.'

20

The Court and Commission maintained this posture in their
118 See generallv Baden Fuller, Economic Issues Relating to Proper(y Rights in Trademarks:

Export Bans, Differential Pircing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging, 6 EUR. L. REv. 162, 169
(1981) (citing B. YAMEY, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1966)). See also Waelbroeck, Vertical
Agreements: Is the Commission Right Not to Follow the Current U.S. Policy?, 25 Swiss REV. OF INT'L
COMPETITION L. 49 (1985); N. GREEN, supra note 51, at 367-68.

119 Commission Decision of 17 December 1986, relating to a proceeding under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31,428-32 - Yves Rocher), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) 49, 52,
pt. 30, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at 12,051, pt. 30 (1986).
120 See Commission Decision of 5 October 1973, relating to a proceet...Ig tinder Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.010 - Deutsche Philips GmbH), 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 293) 40 (1973); Commission Decision of 11 December 1980, relating to a proceeding
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/26.912 - Hennessy-Henkell), 23 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 383) 11 (1980); Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.

883, 11983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

14,245, at 16,440 (1986).
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consideration of the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher agreements.
Although both networks published recommended prices, the Court
considered the mere communication of recommendations to be
outside of Article 85(1) so long as there was no "concerted practice
between the franchisor and the franchisee or between franchisees
with a view to the actual application of such prices."' 12 The Commission concurred with the Court, but reserved the right to intervene should evidence be found of coercion or collusion in
establishing uniform prices. The Commission, in Yves Rocher, was
especially thorough in identifying seemingly unrelated clauses in the
contract and pointing out their potential for establishing an indirect
price maintenance system. These included the right of the
franchisor to inspect the franchisee's stocks, accounts, and balance
sheets,' 2 2 or the requirement that the franchisee
submit its advertis23
ing to the franchisor for prior approval.'
In certain circumstances, franchises operating solely within a
single Member State may practice resale price maintainance because
of the tolerance of some national antitrust laws. 12 4 However, because such practices tend to compartmentalize the national markets
and hinder the integration of the Common Market, the Commission
will attack these networks if the resale price maintenance is accompanied by any restrictions on export, parallel importation, customer restrictions, or price alignment for imported products. 12 5 The fact that
the practice is tolerated by the law of the Member State is no defense
26
for the offending franchisor.1
D.

Tying, Exclusive PurchasingRequirements, and Full Line Forcing

Article 85(l)(e) prohibits arrangements which "make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other party of supplementary obligations which . . . have no connection with the

subject of such contracts." In franchising, the conclusion of the contract allowing the franchisee to use the franchisor's identity,
tradename, or trademark (the tying product) is often subject to the
121 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

122
(CCH)
123
124

14,245, at 16,440 (1986).

Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 56, pt. 50, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
at 12,054, pt. 50.
Id. at 55, pt. 44, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,053, pt. 44.
For example, the Netherlands permits a producer or wholesaler to specify the re-

sale price for many products. See SURVEY OF FOREIGN LAWS & REGULATIONS AFFECTING
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, Vetherlands 7 (1982) 1hereinafter SURVEY OF FOREIGN LAWS &
REGULATIONS].
125 See Gijlstra & Murphy, supra note 46, at 108; Commission Decision of 25 February
1982, relating to a proceeding tinder Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/428 VBBB/VBVB), 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 54 ) 36 (1982); Commission Decision of 5

October 1973, relating to a proceeding Under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.010 Deutsche Philips GmbH), 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 293) 40 (1973).
126 Deutsche Philips, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 293) at 42, pt. II 2(c).
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franchisee's acceptance of the obligation to purchase all of its supplies (the tied product) exclusively from the franchisor. Both the
Pronuptia and the Yves Rocher franchise agreements contained requirements of this sort. 12 7 At issue, of course, is whether the tying of
a tradename or trademark license to supplies runs afoul of Article
85(1)(e).
In the United States, allegations of unlawful tying has generated
the most private litigation in franchising. Since the late 1960s, hundreds of antitrust actions have been brought against franchisors alleging that franchisors forced franchisees to buy equipment or
supplies or lease property as a condition of acquiring or retaining
their franchise.12 8 The anticompetitive effects of tying considered by
the courts in these cases were embodied in the "leverage theory,"
which focuses on the franchisor's use of legal monopoly power over
its intellectual property to artificially create a market for the tied
products, and the related "coercion theory," which considers the
comparative bargaining power of the franchisor and the franchisee,
and the possibility for the franchisor to coerce the franchisee into
buying the tied product. 129 The frequency of these cases and their
rates of success rapidly declined following the landmark decision in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.. 13o Since then, courts have
held in a number of cases that tying was to be considered under a
"rule of reason" analysis wherein relevant economic and business
justifications could be brought forth.13'
The Court and Commission have avoided most of this controversy by recognizing that although tying can be used in a way incompatible with Article 85(1), it is often inextricably linked with the
imposition of quality control measures, and hence essential to the
reputation of the franchisor. This approach has been used consistently with respect to patent licensing since the early 1960s,13 2 and
127 Commission Decision of 17 December 1986, in proceedings under Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty, (IV/30,937 - Pronuptia), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39, 42, pt. 11. 4

Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

10,854, at 12,040, pt. 11 (1986); Commission Decision of 17

December 1986, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31,42832 - Yves Rocher), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) 49, 54, pt. 26, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.

(CCH)

10,855, at 12,051, pt. 26 (1986).

128 L. Rudnick, Introduction to Franchising, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING-AN OVERVIEW 60 (Mendelsohn ed. 1983).
129 D. Thompson, FRANCHISE OPERATION AND ANTITRUST 77-78 (1971).
130 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
131 See Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Principe v.
McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61,870 (C.D. Cal. 1979), afftd,

664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
1:12 See Commission Decision of 22 December 1971, relating to a proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/5400 - Burroughs-Delphanque), 17 O.J. EuR. CoMM.
(No. 1. 13) 50 (1971); Commission Decision of 22 December 197 1, concerning a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/5405 - Burroughs/Geha-Werke). 17 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. 1. 13) 53 (1971).
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has more recently been extended to trademark licensing.' 33 Nonetheless, the reservation remains that tying clauses involving products
or services unrelated
to quality control are still considered contrary
1 4
to Article 85(1). 3
The tying agreements utilized in both the Pronuptia and Yves
Rocher franchising agreements conformed precisely to the expectations of the Court and Commission. The Pronuptia agreement required the purchasing of goods solely from the franchisor and
additionally required the franchisee to stock a full line of products
illustrated in the franchisor's catalogue.' 3 5 However, in language
tracking that of Article 85(1)(e), "goods not connected with the essential object of the franchise business" were not tied to the
franchise agreement and could be obtained from a supplier of the
franchisee's choice.' 36 Similarly, the Yves Rocher agreement required the purchase of the cosmetics from the franchisor,' 3 7 but the
franchisee was free to purchase accessories and furnishings from any
supplier. The Court and Commission found that Article 85(1) did
not apply to such provisions to the extent that they ensured a uniform range of goods because the tying of the products to the trademarks and full line forcing were "inherent in the very nature of the
38
franchise agreement."
Indeed, the Court takes an even more permissive view of tying
than the Commission does regarding licensing agreements. The
Commission had previously contended that where quality control
standards and technical specifications were possible to quantify objectively, then tying of the goods to the licensing contract was not
indispensable to the reputation of the network. 139 In the Pronuptia
opinion, though, the Court allowed a further business justification to
apply in such cases; if, because of the large number of franchises,
monitoring the compliance with specifications would prove too
costly, a franchisor could opt to require the purchasing of the tied
product solely from itself.' 40 A secondary consideration related to
the tying clause is the exclusive purchase obligation. Clearly, if a
133 Commission Decision of 23 December 1977, relating to proceedings under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/171, IV/856, IV/172, IV/I17, IV/28.173 - Campari), 21 0.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69 (1977).
134 See Blaisse, supra note 70, at n.42.
135 Pronuptia, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) at 40-41, pt. 11, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.

(CCH) at 12,040, pt. 11.
136 Id.
137 I'ves Rocher, 30 0J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 55, pt. 28, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.

(CCH) at 12,051, pt. 28. The purchase could be made from another franchisee in the
network.
8 Pronuptia, 30

0.J.

EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) at 44-45, pt. 27, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.

(CCH) at 12,044, pt. 27.
13,) Venit, supra note 15, at 219.

140 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14.245, at 16,439 (1986).
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franchisee is required to obtain all of its supplies from the franchisor,
then it is likewise required to sell exclusively the franchisor's products. Generally, the exclusive purchase obligation, like the tying
clause, is justifiable because of the need to protect reputation, safeguard confidences and to facilitate efficient distribution.
However, exclusive purchasing obligations may themselves have
anticompetitive effects. For example, network-wide exclusive
purchasing obligations of long duration imposed by a franchisor with
sufficient market power may act as a barrier to entry for aspiring interbrand competitors. Aspiring competitors, in such circumstances,
must enter the market at two levels; not only must they produce the
competitive product, but, since most of the the competent franchisees have been bound exclusively, the competitors must create their
own costly distribution network.14
The Court and Commission have recognized both the benefits
of exclusive purchasing arrangements and the potential anticompetitive effects. For the vast number of distribution agreements with duration of five years or less, exemption under Article 85(3) for
exclusive purchasing obligations is granted by Commission Regulation 84/83. However, the Court has stated:
Agreements under which an enterprise agrees to obtain its supplies only from one enterprise to the exclusion of all others, do not,
merely because of their type, fulfill the conditions for incompatability with the Common Market contained in Article 85(1) of the
Treaty. They may, however, fulfill them where either in isolation or
together with others in the economic and legal context in which they
were concluded and on the basis of all objective elements of law
or of fact, they are likely to impair trade between Member States and
their object or effect is to prevent, restrict, or distort
competition.

142

Thus, the Court requires examination not only of the market power
of the franchisor, but also examination of the practices of other existing franchisor or distributors throughout the industry.
In considering the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher franchise networks, neither the Court nor the Commission suggested that the exclusive purchasing obligations might, under certain market
conditions, infringe Article 85(1), but rather held them to be outside
of the Article's scope altogether. To draw the conclusion that the
failure to mention market conditions indicates a more relaxed posture toward franchise exclusive purchasing than toward other distribution systems, however, would be premature since neither
Pronuptia nor Yves Rocher had, in fact, more than a modest share of
43
their respective markets.'
141 See

Chard, supra note 58, at 419.

142 S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin- Janssen, 13 Recueil 525, [1967- 1970

Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8,053, at 7,805 (1967).
41 Goebel, writing after the Court judgment but before the Commission decision,
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E. Noncompetition Covenants
The fact that the Commission and Court view franchising as a
sui generis form of distribution is evidenced most distinctly in their
treatment of the noncompetition covenants found in both the
Pronuptia and Yves Rocher franchise agreements. These covenants
restrained the franchisee from competing with the franchisor for the
duration of the contract and one year thereafter.
The Court and the Commission's assessment of these clauses
was surprising in two regards. First, although the Court and Commission have always viewed noncompetition clauses permissively,
they had always required exemption under Article 85(3), recognizing
the inherent threat of such clauses to competition. Surprisingly,
however, the Court in Pronuptia found the noncompetition clause to
be outside the scope of Article 85(1),144 considering the clause to be
essential in preventing the loss of business confidences. The second
surprise was that the post-termination covenant was accepted by the
Court and Commission. Prior to Pronuptia, it was generally assumed
that post-termination covenants were contrary to competition policy
and would require substantial justification for exemption. This assumption was founded on the tightening of the Commission's exclusive dealing regulations from the 1967 version, 14 5 where one year
post-termination covenants were allowed, to the 1983 version, where
they were explicitly disallowed. It is apparent that the Court and
Commission were once again motivated by the unique relationship
of confidentiality between the franchisor and franchisee, and the exposure that the franchisor faces once a franchisee has left the
46
network. 1

VI.

The Emergence of the Rule of Reason

Judge ReneJoilet, the draftsman of the PronuptiaCourt decision,
authored an article as a law professor in 1984 in which he advocated
suggests that the Court has taken a more liberal view towards franchising exclusive
purchase obligations. Goebel, supra note 15, at 697. However, in fact, Pronuptia's market
in every country other than France was modest. Pronuptia, 30

OJ. EUR.

COMM. (No. L 13)

at 39, pt. 6, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,039, pt. 6. Also, Yves Rocher's share was a
maximum of 7.5% in its best market. Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) at 50, pt. 9,
4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 12,048, pt. 9. The Court may have felt such dicta was
beyond the facts of the case.
144 In many cases, exemption for noncompetition covenants is granted automatically
through the Exclusive Dealing Block Exemptions. Regulation 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2,730 (1983); Regulation
1984/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 5 (1983), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2,733
(1983).
145 Art. 2(l)(a), Regulation 67/67, 10 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. 57) 849 (1967), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2,727B (1967).
14i Preamble, pt. 8, Regulation 83/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) I (1983), 2
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2,739 (1983); Regulation 1984/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 173) 5 (1983), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2,733.
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a rule of reason approach to Article 85(1). He stated that the "restriction of competition" prohibited by Article 85(1) could be interpreted in two ways: either strictly, wherein any technical restriction,
intrabrand or interbrand, would be prohibited, or more broadly,
where only restrictions of market competition could be prohibited,
and restrictions with no market effect, e.g., intrabrand restrictions,
would be outside the Article's scope. This latter position, he argued,
contains a rule of reason approach, requiring the Commission or
Court to perform the economic analysis necessary to assess market
impact of an agreement prior to the application of competition law,
and especially prior to the application of Articles 85(2) and (3).147
In this regard, the Pronuptia Court decision, apart from its applicability to franchising, is a major policy statement of the Court; it is
one of the first instances where the Court or Commission have fully
embraced the position advocated by Professor Joilet. Indeed, while
other cases have experimented with more flexibility in the application of Article 85(1), at least one commentator has compared the
significance of the Pronuptia decision to that of the Sylvania decision
148
and its impact on U.S. antitrust law.
The rule of reason, as the term has developed in the U.S. competition law, is the weighing of competitive harms and benefits of an
agreement or conspiracy, taking into account market conditions,
business justifications, and effects upon intra- and interbrand competition. 149 The antithesis to the rule of reason in the per se approach,
namely, the view that an agreement which restricts trade is, by its
very existence and irrespective of its impact on the market, illegal.
Prior to the 1977 Sylvania case, restraints of trade in the United
States were generally analyzed on a per se basis. The Sylvania case
changed this; the Supreme Court differentiated between vertical and
horizontal restraints of trade, and declared virtually all vertical restraints to be subject to the rule of reason analysis, rather than the
per se analysis. The impact of the case was tremendous: tying arrangements, exclusivity, and territoriality have become essentially
per se legal. Unless the complainant can demonstrate that the defendant had no legitimate economic or business justification, and
further that the defendant can in fact influence the market, the com50
plaint will fail.'
Under traditional EEC legal theory, Article 85(1), is a per se
prohibition of all agreements which in any way "prevent, restrict or
Joilet, supra note 71.
Goebel, supra note 15, at 692, (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
141)
See generally Gyselen, supra note 100, at 658.
150 For a comprehensive article analyzing the application of the rule of reason to a
case study, see Stern, Zelek & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Analysis of Ten'itorial
Restrictions in the
Soft Drink Industry, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 481 (1982).
147

148
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distort" competition. The Treaty leaves considerations of relevant
economic factors, business justifications, and market impact to Article 85(3), where exemptions from the penalties of violation of competition law are provided. The approach that Judge Joilet suggests,
and the approach generally adopted in the Pronuptia opinion, provides for the relevant market considerations to be made prior to the
application of Article 85(1), altogether removing those agreements
justifiable under a rule of reason analysis from the scope and prohibition of Article 85(1). The critical factors for the determination of
which agreements fall within Article 85(1) appear to be the same distinctions applied in Sylvania: the distinctions between vertical and
horizontal restraints of trade and between intra- and interbrand
competition.
The European Court's requirement of an Article 85(3) "rule of
reason" analysis as a prerequisite to any consideration of whether
the franchise agreement restrains trade contrary to Article 85(1) effectively limits initial scrutiny of the franchise network's effect on
competition to the area where franchising is actually beneficial, that
of overall market competition. The Court has expressed its approval
of commercial arrangements, like franchising, that promote consumer choice and interbrand competition; franchising, which threatens mainly interbrand competition, is primarily only a vertical
restraint of trade.15
In Pronuptia, while the Court did not go so far as to say that all
vertical agreements were to be subject to rule of reason analysis, it
did hold that a subset of vertical agreements, namely those agreements.forming franchise networks, are outside of Article 85(1). In
this regard Pronuptiajoins a limited number of other cases where the
Court experimented with a similar approach regarding selective distributorships, 52 exclusive plant breeding rights,' 53 and exclusive
film copyright licenses.' 54 In each of these cases, the Court, after
conducting a degree of economic analysis, concluded that the relationships promoted interbrand competition. These arrangements'
lack of effect on actual market competition was more important than
their tendency to restrain trade as "trade" is technically defined.
This school of thought contrasts strongly with the approach taken in
the 1966 Consten & Grundig case, where the Court rejected the argument that agreements, in this case exclusive distribution agreements
which promoted interbrand competition at the sake of intrabrand
151 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
152 Metro SB-GroBmiiarkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct.J.

Rep. 1875.
153 L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2015.
154 Coditel SA, Compagnie G~nrale pour la Diffusion de laT616vision v. Cin6 Vog
Films SA, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3381.
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competition, should be outside of Article 85(1).155

The Pronuptia Court did, however, warn that while franchise
agreements themselves did not restrict competition, exceptional
cases might contain independently anticompetitive clauses that
might be subject to Article 85(1). For example, where an exclusivity
and location clause together amounted to absolute territorial protection, as they would in the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher situations considering the insignificance of passive sales of fashion goods, 156 the
Court was unwilling to exclude those clauses from the scope of Article 85(1). But even with regard to these clauses, it is important that
the clauses were not automatically considered per se violations of
Article 85(1) as similar clauses have been treated in the past. Moreover, since the franchisee was arguing that the agreement was void,
and the absolute territorial protection was established primarily for
its sake, there was no one with an interest in persuading the Court
that such protection was reasonable under a rule of reason analysis . 1 5 7 Perhaps in subsequent cases, such clauses will be included in
an exclusion from the prohibition of Article 85(1).
But where the Court may have erred on the side of caution regarding territoriality and location clauses, it seemed to err on the
side of precipitance in its rush to embrace the rule of reason. In the
Pronuptia opinion, the Court's initial precedent on franchising and
the rule of reason, it would have been prudent to insist upon an analysis of the market context of franchise agreements prior to concluding that such agreements fall outside of competition law. Nowhere
does the Court examine whether the Pronuptia franchise erects undue barriers to entry on the part of competitors, whether the
franchisor is dominant in a local market, whether the market has any
parallel importers, or whether the franchise requires special consid58
eration due to its position in a declining or infant industry.'
One can only speculate as to where the rule of reason will lead
the Court and Commission in the future with regard to franchising.
One area already ripe for development is a clarification and enumeration of those restraints of competition which, while sometimes vertical in nature, will be considered per se violations of Article 85(1).
Two instances come to mind: namely resale price maintenance and
absolute territorial protection.. While the Court and Commission remain adamant regarding their prohibition of these restraints
notwithstanding a rule of reason analysis, EEC legal scholars are beginning to argue that under certain conditions, even these restraints
55 Ltablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, 1966
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8,046 (1966).
1% Korah, supra note 15, at 100, n.7.
157 Id. at 100.
158 Goebel, supra note 15, at 693-94.
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may be justifiable and thus should be considered under a rule of rea59
son as well.1
One such legal scholar, Advocate General van Themaat, in his
opinion regarding the Pronuptia case, suggested that Article 85(1)
should be applied only to the horizontal effects of vertical agreements. As he stated: "With regard to such vertical obligations I think
Article 85(1) can only apply when it can be shown in a particular case
that they cause injury to third parties (competitors, suppliers, or purchasers), which will seldom be the case where there are adequate alternative chains of distribution for similar products.' 60 In the case
of franchising, the horizontal effects which the Advocate-General
suggested should be of particular concern are (i) whether barriers to
entry are erected, (ii) whether injur is caused to parallel importers,
or (iii) whether the agreement results in price increases or concerted
price-fixing.' 6' Absent from the list is resale price maintenance,
which van Themaat believes will have a horizontal effect only in the
cases where a franchisee is dominant on a local market or where
1 62
competitors also practice price maintenance.
While van Themaat's position has not yet become the Court or
Commission's official stance, it is not as idealistic as it may seem. In
the Maize Seed case, the Court itself indicated a similar analytical
framework when it held that:
having regard to the specific nature of the products in question, the
Court concludes that ... the grant of an open exclusive license, that
is to say a license which does not affect the position of third parties
such as parallel importers and licensees for other territories, is not
in itself incompatible with Article 85(1) of the Treaty. 163

VII.

Conclusions: The Future of Franchising in the Common Market
The Pronuptia and Yves Rocher Court of Justice and Commission
decisions have provided the impetus for the rapid development of
franchising in the Common Market. The institutions of the Community have expressed their overwhelming approval of the method of
distribution; its perceived benefits to consumer welfare, employment, risk minimization, and uniform marketing concepts are viewed
as positive economic and unification forces for the European Community. Indeed, in many regards, franchising is treated more favorably in a legal context than other forms of distribution. The certainty,
flexibility, and inapplicability of Article 85(1) offered by the Court
and Commission decisions all make franchising a highly attractive al151) Id. See generally Chard, supra note 58.
16 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245, at 16,452 (1986) (opinion of Advocate General P. Verl.oren
van Themaat).
161 Id.
162 Id.
16"3Nungesser, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2,069, pt. 58.
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ternative for European businesses or foreign businesses seeking to
develop markets within the Common Market.
But the potential surge of franchising in the Common Market
may be accompanied by difficulties as well. The favorable treatment
which franchising is receiving may lead businesses to reorganize
their EEC distribution networks into franchising networks merely to
take advantage of these legal benefits, and such a trend may distort
the development of European marketing.
An inevitable consequence of a rapid growth in franchising will
be the legal problems arising during the life span of the franchise
relationship. While generally outside of the competence of the Commission and Court, the contractual relationship between the
franchisor and franchisee presents unique legal questions which the
present contract laws of the Member States may be ill-equipped to
entertain.' 64 In the United States' experience with franchising, the
troublesome points of the franchise relationship are the creation and
the termination points. In the creation of franchises, policy-makers
and courts are concerned that potential franchisees receive adequate, honest, and full disclosure of all relevant risks and liabilities.
Likewise, the injustice of the termination of a hard-working franchisee for sometimes spurious reasons has perplexed policy-makers
and courts for years. For a period, especially prior to the Sylvania
case, antitrust laws seemed to provide remedies for franchisees
where contract law proved unsatisfactory. Since Sylvania, with its
favorable treatment of vertical restraints of trade, franchisees have
sought relief from oppressive tactics from a number of laws and regulations at both the state and federal level, most of which were en16 5
acted soon after Sylvania.
The Pronuptia and Yves Rocher decisions have left the same void
164 See, e.g., Fern & Klein, Restrictions on Terminations and Nonrenewal of Franchises:,4 Policy
Analysis, 36 Bus. LAW. 1041 (1981); Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination RightsFranchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465; Geotz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981). Commentators have noted that U.S. contract law as applied to
franchising generally fails to be adequate for two primary reasons: First, the inequity in
bargaining power (contract law ignores this unless coercion or duress is alleged) and second, the quasi-fiduciary relationship formed by the partners to a franchise agreement,
which entails the parties to rights beyond those found in the strict terms of the contract.
165 For example, with regard to the creation of franchises, the Federal Trade Commission has promulgated far-reaching rules. See Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1987). A
number of states have similar provisions. See, e.g., Fine, Recent Development in State Law
Affecting Franchising, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547. With regard to termination of franchises, at
the federal level legislation exists aimed at particularly troublesome industries: the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (1982) and the Automobile Dealer's Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1982). A number of states have similar statutes aimed at these and
other industries, including farm machinery and implement franchises, beer and wine
wholesale franchises, and broad regulations governing the termination of franchises generally. See, e.g., Eaton, State Regulation of Franchisesand Dealership Terminations: An Overview, 49
ANrrRUST L.J. 1331 (1980).
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in remedies for franchisees that the Sylvania case did for U.S. franchisees. On the one hand, it is commendable that the Court and
Commission avoided being perceived as the intervenor for bad-faith
franchisees seeking to relieve themselves of their contractual obligations. 166 However, the disparity in bargaining power between
franchisor and franchisee is a reality. Where Community competition law still applies to franchising, as where a franchisee is terminated for engaging in parallel trading, the institutions of the
Community should vigorously protect the franchisee. Apart from
that, if the Community is serious about fostering a positive environment for franchising, it should urge Member States to enact laws requiring full disclosure in the sale of franchises and remedies upon
termination. 167
It is gratifying to see the Commission and Court view franchising in such a positive light; a view clearly inspired by the tremendous
potential for franchising in the Common Market. Although various
questions remain unanswered, and future developments lie yet undiscovered, the infrastructure set out by the Pronuptiaand Yves Rocher
decisions is a solid foundation for a healthy future. Franchises
modeled after the Pronuptia or Yves Rocher contracts can be assured of their compatibility with EEC competition policies and
franchises with special requirements can proceed with the assurance
of the rule of reason and the doctrine of ancillary restraints. Without
a doubt, the dynamism that franchising has displayed in recent years
will continue, and franchising will grow into a dominant force in
Community distribution.

166 Van Empel, supra note 15, at 414.
167 Only Belgium has legislation which provides a measure of relief for terminated
franchisees. The Law of July 27, 1961, as amended by the Law of April 13, 1971, and
applicable to exclusive distributorships and perhaps franchises, providing for reasonable
notice prior to termination and "just indemnity." It is designed to compensate the distributor for the enrichment of the supplier upon termination since the supplier may gain unjustly from increased clientele, expenses incurred by the terminated distributor, and
further compensates employees dismissed. This law is typical of the most recent of
franchise regulations in the United States, which attempt to make termination of franchises
equitable to both parties without hampering their business freedom. See SURVEY OF FOREIGN LAws & REGULATIONS, Belgium, supra note 124, at 5-6.

